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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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FROM WESTERN EUROPE TO EUROPE*
EGON BAHR
Introduction
If we had met in 1946 or 1919, in both cases one year after a World War, 
we would have been confronted with similar questions as today: what 
would the new world order be like and what should be Europe's role at 
the end of an epoch?
This is the subject of the four lectures contained in this paper. We are 
facing the end of the East-West conflict, which is the end of that 40 years 
long era also called Cold War. On the other hand we find ourselves at the 
end of the historical experiment, which started with the October 
Revolution in 1917.
Europe can heave a sigh of relief. The Eastern threat is over, the po­
tential one by weapons as well as the one by ideological demands. New 
problems and risks have occurred, however. Theoretically we have al­
ways wanted exactly this, but practically we are entirely unprepared to 
face the new situation.
That really demands a new way of thinking. All apparently secured 
convictions, rules and goals have to be reconsidered. I am far from pre­
senting ready-made concepts for the new world order, but possibly there 
is an orientation for such concepts by analyzing the changes and by 
drawing some conclusions.
International security after the East-West conflict is the first subject 
that will be discussed. I will deal with the relation between the world 
powers, the experiences after the Gulf War and the possible future role of 
the United Nations.
The second lecture is about Europe after the East-West conflict and 
treats the consequences of the end of military confrontation, questions of 
integration and disintegration of existing organizations, new conflict 
sources, special interests of individual states and the role of the Atlantic 
Alliance, CSCE and the European Community.
The third lecture deals with Germany after the end of the East-West 
conflict, i.e. the break-down of the GRD, the problem of welding two 
societies and especially the problem of welding two armies, developed and
* Four lectures given in the framework of the Jean Monnet Chair Lecture Series of the European Policy 




























































































integrated in opposition to each other. I shall try to give some prospects 
on Germany's future role in the new world.
In the fourth lecture, finally, I will talk about armament and disarma­
ment in the new world, including the role of nuclear weapons, of con­
ventional disarmament in Europe, the new weapon systems, the principle 
of modernization and finally the auspices for a new European peace or­
der.
1. International Security After the East-West Conflict
The reasons why the allies of the second World War have become oppo­
nents, exercising a policy of brinkmanship, will not be dealt with here. 
America, with its monopoly of nuclear weapons, was able to develop a 
strategy of massive retaliation, to organize an alliance of conventional 
defence including the Federal Republic and to give the incentive for eco­
nomic recovery of those parts of Europe that were able to accept their 
help by the ingenious Marshall Plan. When, at the end of the fifties, the 
Soviet Union developed the intercontinental missile and America became 
vulnerable for the first time in its history, Washington logically devel­
oped the strategy of flexible response by smaller nuclear weapons with 
the possibility to limit war to Europe only.
Even if America has always been qualitatively ahead of the Soviet 
Union with the development and introduction of new weapon systems, the 
Soviet armament reached quantities that made the US qualitative ad­
vantage practically ineffective. Both super powers obtained what the 
Americans rightfully called mutual assured destruction (MAD), the as­
sured second strike capability. This remains valid even today. The devel­
opment of this rivalry with mutual vulnerability resulted in the common 
interest of security against error and a limitation of the armament spiral, 
the continuation had become senseless. One might describe this phase as 
global nuclear conspiracy with continued global rivalry, which resulted in 
the nuclear test stop convention, the ABM treaty and the SALT nego­
tiations. China appeared on the scene as a potential global nuclear power 
with all those complicated reflexions that the perspective of a triangle in­
volves. The Soviet Union had established itself claiming to be a world 
power with equal rights. From a security policy point of view, the dif­
ference between these two and all the others increased instead of decreas­
ing and was nowhere more obvious than in the two satellite systems in the 
space indispensable for the observation and prewarning against strategic 
systems with their flight duration of only 30 to 35 minutes. The laws of 
physics thus prevented Western Europe from developing its own 




























































































This bipolarity has now come to an end. Perez de Cuellar has said he 
sometimes felt uncomfortable with two super powers; with only one it 
could be even more so.
America is the only remaining super power, if a super power is defined 
by its capability to perform sufficient power projection at any spot on the 
globe. The Gulf War has shown the United States also as the first 
conventional power being able to apply successfully superior technology. 
It was logical that President Bush and NATO called the Soviet Union a 
friend after the end of the East-West conflict. I remember a Soviet friend, 
who predicted in 1986: 'We are going to do the worst, we are going to 
take away the enemy from you.' And that is where we are now.
Everybody has to reconsider things. America has achieved its goal: 
second to none, but what is the use of their superiority?
The only point that could be redebated would be the elementary wish of 
America to become once again invulnerable. This led to the SDI-pro- 
gramme, a dangerous project during the era of confrontation, since the 
rival had to consider whether to use the possibly last opportunity before 
the vulnerability window would be closed and the superiority would be 
re-established that America had at a time when it possessed nuclear 
monopoly. SDI would no longer constitute a threat against the friend and 
partner of a future world order: he who withdraws from a race need not 
fear the victory of the quicker one. All the same the question remains: 
why the immense expenditure of intelligence and money, if there is no 
longer any threat?
It is cheaper and easier to approach a controlled disarmament of 
strategic systems so radically, so that the smaller nuclear powers cannot 
avoid cooperating by opting for a well balanced minimal quantity of nu­
clear missile systems, in order to deter adventurers with nuclear ambition 
and in order to make waterproof the non-proliferation convention. One 
hundred of such systems in the United States and the Soviet Union 
together with 20 in each one of the small nuclear powers would still be 
sufficient objectively in order not to let the idea of deterrence die, but 
would not be considered as a threat and might build the bridge to com­
mon control of minor reserves that might remain necessary against those 
who want to break the achieved nuclear peace.
In the new epoch of history I see a real chance to remove the lethal 
threat that mankind has created through the invention of nuclear weapons. 
The military industrial complex is more important in the Soviet Union 
and more powerful in America. Resistance and intrepidation towards the 
possible perspectives of the new era are more visible in the Soviet Union 
and less audible in America. It is indeed an urgent challenge for politics 
to direct intelligence, energy and the capability of this military industrial 




























































































In any case America's responsibility has grown with its power. The 
cautious handling of it is all the more advisable, as all peoples and states 
are well aware of this fact and become freer in pursuing their own inter­
ests, the more it is obvious that none of them is a threat for America.
We are going to experience an interesting reorientation in Peking, 
however. During the past decades Chinese foreign policy was determined 
by the principle of equidistance from both hegemonical powers. If one 
knew that, Chinese policy became quite calculable. Now one of the 
hegemonical powers is gone. A rapprochement of China to the Soviet 
Union could be observed already during the Gulf War. When visiting 
Peking, Gorbachov was able to conclude collaboration with the Chinese, 
which could become potentially even closer than before the break with 
Mao, because a Soviet hegemonical policy is no longer feared. Of course 
there is the Chinese irritation after the collapse of the Soviet Communist 
Party. Chinese Communists as the governing party are like relics from 
another era. But, independent from any effects on the interior develop­
ment of China, I expect that this country will follow its traditions and its 
national interests, where it will meet Russia: two countries, who have 
grown relatively weaker, will support each other.
The end of the East-West conflict will have considerable consequences 
on the world of independent countries. Non-alignment has become 
meaningless if the blocs do not exist any more. The beginning of the dis­
cussion was interesting, that in the future the non-aligned countries would 
rename themselves as 'bloc of poverty’, which hits the truth.
The end of the East-West conflict put an end to the possibility of per­
forming basic reorientations, as did the Egyptian Presidents Nasser and 
Sadat, who, after they were in close touch with the Soviets, now rub 
shoulders with America. Transforming or exploiting the East-West 
conflict is over, nobody can expect any profit, like for instance Haile 
Selassi or Mengistu. The threat to get the weapons refused by the West 
from the East, can no more be made to come true, as it happened in 
Angola. Cuba will not send any expedition corps. India might loosen up 
its ties with Moscow and Washington might not consider necessary to 
support Pakistan as much as before. Washington and Moscow are trust­
worthy when they stop delivering weapons to Afghanistan.
As the East-West conflict exists no more, it cannot be settled any more 
in the Third World. But these states will not only loose their former po­
litical alternatives; they will win new space for minor regionally limited 
conflicts. Liberia is an example. South Sudan another one, people will die, 
because the world is looking away, does not feel threatened and can wait 
until local passages of arms have suffocated with their own weakness. For 
the world the end of the East-West conflict bears less danger. That is 






























































































The countries of the Third World will win new space, bec£bse_ jhe«^ 
request for economic participation, for justice, for equal changes ind so­
cial balance can no longer be suspected of being guided by Ggrnmunism.
In the future they will only address their requests to the differently ricfr 
countries. Of course the Soviet Union was blackmailed, too, anSpthey 
fered it gladly as long as they thus won influence. Freed from the rr^mter^^P 
of the communistic striving for world power, the West alone will be put 
under pressure to help in order to avoid the masses' pauperization from 
growing incontrollably.
The pauperization of masses - wasn't that the beginning of that move­
ment, which started with the Industrial Revolution and ended with the 
October Revolution in 1917? We are in the middle of a new industrial 
revolution, which is not only restricted to Europe this time, but is a 
global one. Without a super-power Soviet Union this can lead to a renais­
sance of social movements from the Third World, which would be the 
more dangerous, as they would be unable to threat with arms, but with 
the despair of people who have nothing to lose.
At the horizon a world emerges in which the Soviet imperialism has 
left the field to the imperialism of the rich alone, in which there are no 
Communist governments and a new social revolution does not ask for 
anything but the values the West is that proud of and after the end of 
former Soviet Union even more proud. It might be time to think about 
the strategy for avoiding a social revolution taking its force from the 
principles of justice and international law.
In the coming generation capitalism will have to prove that even with­
out the challenge by Communism it is able to justify its ethical value to 
create a life in dignity for a major part of the people. Money alone as su­
perior standard for success will not be sufficient. Capitalism, too, will 
perish and follow Communism, if it does not become capable of refor­
mation sufficiently to suffice its moral claims.
Africa, which is at our doorstep, will retain our special interest. Almost 
all states have given up Leninism-Marxism as official ideology. Europe 
was too busy with itself to realize the immense changes on the Black 
Continent. An African Perestroika has taken place. Already in July 1990 
the OAU Summit concluded a Democratic Charter with the main issue of: 
'Putting the people first.' This should be the guideline of all future policy. 
What a wisdom, after the people in Berlin had removed the Wall one year 
before and the people in Moscow had prevented the Putsch one year later.
We now experience a power-political retreat from Africa by the Soviet 
Union, at least a break in their relations, but a retreat by the United States 
at the same time. Ken Adelman, an expert on African affairs and Head of 
the American Arms Control Agency under Reagan, does not look upon 
Africa as a model for success offering inspiration and orientation. Africa 




























































































the world's economy amounts to scarcely one percent. Africa on its own 
wins the freedom of starvation, and at the end of the East-West conflict its 
chances for an economical and political new start are minor. A sociologist 
from Kenya has formulated: Democracy cannot be produced like Nescafe. 
This applies to the Soviet Union, too, by the way. But how can democracy 
develop, if not even the necessary raw material for its production is 
delivered? What else can people do than migrate to the products, if the 
products do not come to them? We have experienced that in the former 
GDR and we shall see the same phenomenon in Eastern Europe and in 
Africa, too. Migration is the weapon of the poor, which does not shoot 
but hits.
Before we turn our attention to the United Nations, we should analyze 
some of the results of the Gulf War, that would not have ended as it did 
without the end of the East-West conflict. The Soviet Union did not make 
any use of its veto-power in the Security Council and has thus enabled 
resolutions permitting America to demonstrate what it is able to do and 
what it is not.
What it is able to do is impressing indeed. After the Gulf War America 
is the most important power conventionally, too. Though under especially 
favourable geographic conditions, we have experienced a war that has 
absolutely no parallels in history. Comparisons between the Gulf War and 
the technique of the Second World War would only make sense if one 
compared it with the Crimean War as well. At the end of the sixties an 
American Joint Chief of Staff spoke of a soldier's dream soon to become 
true, to control day and night each square mile of an overlookable theatre 
of war which can be covered by constant firing with high-precision 
weapons almost simultaneously with its observation. In the Gulf we 
experienced the first electronic war, hopefully the last one, too. Anyhow, 
technique and tactics applied there would paralyze Europe within a very 
short time. Our highly civilized and cabled social order would be pushed 
back by 100 years within one hundred hours into the 19th century, even if 
we were so incredibly lucky that all of our approximately 200 nuclear 
reactors would remain unharmed. Conventionally, too, Europe is no 
longer capable of warfare, if it is a matter of using the most modern 
conventional arms on its territory.
The air-land battle tactic - which has been rejected by Germany for 
good reasons - was introduced by the United States in their forces and 
applied in the same way like the follow-on-forces tactic, which means 
blows against the second echelon in order to avoid the supply of fresh 
troops. Europeans can be happy that they were spared the proof that 
America applied their most modern means in their own interest, inde­
pendently of whether the allies would join them. This is only a statement, 
but no reproach. Strategic fighters have started in the States, were sup­




























































































retically they could have reached Soviet territory within further one to 
one and a half hours. The Soviet Union has seen this, analyzed it and 
drawn conclusions. Their militaries can have no doubt that their country 
can only keep up the balance with nuclear weapons and that on all other 
fields it is too weak economically in order to catch up the growing 
American advantage.
America was unable to gather its incredible war machinery in such 
short a time at the Gulf without the structures of NATO and without its 
bases in Europe, its troops in Germany and the arsenals of the Federal 
Army, in which American officers felt as if it was Christmas when they 
selected weapons and ammunition.
From the important book written by the British historian, Paul 
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, it can be concluded that 
during the past 500 years there have well been big powers that have risen 
and fallen. One characteristic of the decline was the overstretching of 
power. In former times, when super-powers were not strong enough, 
they took allies and paid them subsidies. In the Gulf War it was the con­
trary: the United States asked their allies for subsidies and received them. 
The interesting dispute if they got more than they spent, is not interesting. 
It is only interesting that the United States on their own were unable to 
afford the Gulf War.
In this century we have seen the fall of the British and French Empires, 
the destruction of the German Reich with its claim to rule Europe and the 
implosion of the Soviet Empire. As to America, it seems as if the old 
saying is becoming true: God does not let any tree grow to the sky.
Anyway, at the end of the East-West conflict America is not well pre­
pared for a task, that can be defined as follows: no new world order will 
be maintainable without a sound world economy. The impressive military 
force of the United States after the Gulf War does not help in any way. 
The problems America is facing are immense: it has to settle its deficits in 
the budget and trade balance and start a policy not to remain the world's 
biggest debtor nation, and it has to solve its internal political structural 
problems. It is most improbable that the United States will solve these 
problems while the President is working on his re-election. After that it 
will become harder, but more necessary. America has lived beyond its 
means. It will have to economize and will be unable to raise its living 
standard for a few years: no doubt it is strong enough to solve these 
problems in themselves, but it is in a bad position for the reconstruction 
of the world economy that has now become necessary.
From the security-political point of view the United States at the end of 
the East-West conflict balances between arrogance and retreat. The arro­
gance results from the triumph of victory, the retreat from the knowledge 
of having done a necessary job well. From experience none of the 




























































































overseas bases is advisable. The reduction of their strategic troops con­
cluded in START is an economically welcome discharge, without pre­
cluding any option. So after the big opponent is gone, America prepares 
itself to expect that a new danger is emerging and wishes to maintain the 
capability of performing operations a la Gulf War.
President Bush has drawn his conclusions along the lines: confrontation 
on a lower level, maintaining all options for the future, searching for se­
cured superiority, increased cooperation in the nuclear field.
Like the American Secretary of Defense his new Soviet colleague sees 
his priority in maintaining the stalemate situation in the field of strategic 
nuclear weapons and the entrance to space.
By the way, the Soviet Union needs armament discharge, further re­
duction of conventional troops, considers to reduce military service from 
24 to 18 months and to develop some sort of mixed army composed of 
professionals and draftees. The Soviet Union has remained of equal rank 
because it has kept the mutual assured destruction (MAD) capability. 
Insofar it is safe. On the other hand it is a regional power, gaining im­
portance by its dimension, and furthermore it is a developing country, 
and the Soviet Union is one of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council of the United Nations with power of veto.
When I recently met the first Russian Foreign Minister since 1917, I 
pointed out to him that the power of veto was not divisible or multipliable 
by 10. The Russian Foreign Minister confirmed that it would be rea­
sonable to expect that the Union of Sovereign Republics would further­
more dispose of the veto-right. Of course, this also applies to strategic 
weapons. And the navy, too, cannot be divided between the Ukraine and 
Kazakstan and the space centre of Baikonur is the starting point for the 
Soviet space control and observation system, of which a similar one is 
only owned by the United States.
Now we approach the consequences of the end of the East-West conflict 
on the United Nations. Its increasing number of members has now 
reached 166 and can go up to 175 without modifying the basic structure 
of the Security Council with its five veto powers.
When the United Nations were founded in 1945, a world order for all 
states and peoples was hoped for and it was designed to be a powerful 
instrument against disturbers, with a general staff, troops, the obligation 
to support its members in case of need and the means to pay for it. Armed 
force was only to be applied in the common interest, according to the 
preamble of the Charter of the United Nations. Individual and collective 
right of defence is valid until collective security measures put an end to 
the aggression. As long as this did not function, regional alliances were 
admissible (according to Article 51). Finally the Security Council with its 
right of veto was established against misuse. As we know, instead of a 




























































































ponents could be allowed to be outvoted. Therefore the veto-right became 
an instrument of salvation for the United Nations, as the loser on any 
given occasion was saved from having to quit the organization.
The United Nations were blocked from solving any important problem, 
any part of the East-West conflict, by majority votes. In the very moment 
the mutual blocking of both super powers ended, the success of the 
General Secretary began, who was finally able to apply principles that had 
been forbidden to him so far. After the end of the East-West conflict the 
question arose of whether one could not return to the plans of 1945. If 
one should not begin to carry out, what has been provided in Article 7 of 
the Charter, if the General Staff Committee consisting of the five 
permanent members, which has existed symbolically since the summer of 
1948, will now become reality and receive political meaning. It would 
have to elaborate for which kind of possible mission what kind of troops 
are needed, so that the United Nations can keep the auxiliary instrument 
of the Blue Helmets who are in practice guarantors of cease-fire as long 
as the two parties agree at least: furthermore the member states should 
keep troop contingents ready for such actions, who have to be trained 
together, although this does not create any presumption of their 
participation or not in an acute case. The United Nations should be put in 
a position to re-establish peace by means of power, if all other actions 
fail.
On the other hand the community of nations should no longer be 
obliged to delegate the right of applying military force for the purpose of 
righting violent breaches of international law. This kind of actions should 
be performed under the command and control of the United Nations - 
politically as well as militarily.
To establish a world order means to protect generally conceived rights 
concerning the relations of states. In other words: the alarm about the 
Gulf War should be an incentive for putting in the hands of the United 
Nations the instruments provided in their Charter, which means to replace 
the right of the stronger by the strength of law. That is historically 
necessary and after the end of the East-West conflict even possible, I be­
lieve.
The United Nations were thus to become the collective instrument of 
the states, and this was intended in 1945 already. The system of collective 
security and the power of veto mutually exclude one another. After the 
end of the East-West conflict majority decisions with a renunciation of the 
veto-right are thinkable in all cases of conflict, in which vital rights of 
one of the five permanent member states of the Security Council are not 
involved. But this will not be sufficient for a world order, which could 
only be called order if the powerful are not treated differently from the 
less powerful. In principle a system of qualified majority decisions 




























































































action of the United Nations within the former Soviet Union, in order to 
prevent or terminate war between independent Republics, you might 
suppose that Moscow is even wishing for such an intervention and does 
not make use of its veto-right. But it is difficult to imagine Washington 
renouncing its veto-right in case of a planned UN-action against the US 
for having violated international law.
In all probability these problems are more likely to be solved in 2010 
than by the year 2000. It is also thinkable that the problems of collective 
security will be solved earlier in Europe than globally, the more because 
the United Nations have started to resolve the contradiction between the 
principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of sovereign states and the 
people's right of self-determination.
Just because there are no criteria for it, just because the states will tend 
to consider the established international law as more reliable - at least 
more stabilizing - the modification of the Charter will probably only be­
come possible when the package is tied up that enables global reforms of 
the Charter for a new era.
For the new era the question emerges: should the winning powers of 
World War Two maintain the special rights they granted themselves 50 
years ago for another period of 50 years? Does one have to have nuclear 
power in order to be admitted to the small club of the privileged? In 
Germany there is no tendency to question the renunciation of 
ABC-weapons that Adenauer declared and that all Governments since 
have reconfirmed. No country can be advised to strive for weapons they 
cannot use. Insofar the power of the five veto states is based on nuclear 
weapons, they resemble dinosaurs whose size and mass cannot protect 
them from extinction. Shall the world of the next 50 years be built on the 
principle of nuclear threat? Against whom? Against nuclear weapons? 
Nowadays no nuclear power is the enemy against whom these arms would 
be employable.
What is the source of the veto privilege? Moral qualities, economic 
weight, number of population? In no case would such criteria lead to the 
present group of the five permanent members. If rights are to become the 
base, however, on which the people's community is going towards the 
next millennium, no special rights can be deduced from the past, the nu­
clear equipment and the military power of a state. Special rights could 
result from the services a state is rendering in favour of the international 
community and in the interest of collective security for everybody, and 
the economic development of the world community depends on whedier 
the gap between poor and rich will be minimized convincingly and if we 
are able to stop endangering the environment.
In reality America is needed and abused at the same time in its role as 
world policeman. This will remain unaltered for quite some time, at least 




























































































Nations. The veto system will function even while such a system will be 
established, all the more as none of the five states is demanding to get rid 
of the privilege. Its restriction and the transition to a system of weakening 
the veto power as a step towards its abolition should be pondered in order 
to enable the United Nations to meet the task the world has assigned to 
them in 1945. In any case it is a historical challenge for the United 
Nations to become a global organ of collective security. And now it is 
time to start.
2. Europe After the East-West Conflict
Europe is facing the beginning of a new era. It is difficult to determine 
what the most important reason for it is: the end of the East-West conflict 
or the end of Communism. The leadership of the Soviet Union and the 
iron discipline of the East-West conflict had frozen peoples and states into 
the cold of unfreedom, which brought stability and calculability at the 
same time. Now, as everything is melting, we recognize the peoples with 
their old problems, desires and conflicts, that were only suppressed. The 
old problems reappear, the old passions only slept. The Balkanization of 
the Balkans shows features which are no longer decisively characterized 
by the old order of the old alliances or neutrality.
All the same it is impossible to start again where the deep freeze box of 
the Cold War began to effect its simulated hygiene. Nothing is as it was 
before. The 50 years have taken effect by the mixing of ethnic groups, 
through the development of an economic structure that did not have any 
regard for it. The mixtures have increased, in Yugoslavia and in the 
Soviet Union. In that huge country there are many potential Yugoslavias. 
What we see there, could be easily compared to what we might expect in 
the former Soviet Union.
This country remains of utmost importance to the future development 
of Europe. Let us turn to this subject first. The reasons for the break­
down of Communism can be reduced to a single one: it is impossible to 
alter human beings. It is a fascinating idea, with a claim to be valid 
worldwide, to create a society without conflicts between classes and in 
which each individual can live according to his capabilities and needs.
During the negotiations that I had to lead at the beginning of the sev­
enties with the GDR for the basic treaty, I have predicted to my partner 
the collapse of communism. Of course he denied this with indignation. 
And of course he was curious to hear how I could prove my statement. 
We are still able to understand what Sophocles, Plato and Thucydides and 
other Greek philosophers have written. We remain familiar with the will 
to power, the care for security, love and hatred, the wish for property 




























































































human behaviour have not changed, as if Jesus Christ had never lived. 
The admission of Christianity not to have altered mankind, did not lead to 
its end, because, among other reasons, it promised paradise only in the 
afterlife. Communism, however, wanted to create paradise on earth. That 
is why they had to rebuild man according to the image they had of soci­
ety. The dictatorship of the proletariat wanted to force men to do what an 
idea had defined their happiness. A breathtaking arrogance condemned to 
failure. So far, that is during the almost 70 past years since the October 
revolution, this was not that successful; anyhow Lenin's conviction, 
according to which labour was given prioritary within the society, being 
the way and destination of each individual, was not generally prevailing in 
the Soviet Union. But I admitted: perhaps there had not been enough time 
and I suggested to meet again 500 years later. If communism was more 
successful by then, I would willingly take off my hat.
I did not expect then that the collapse would take only 20 years. It 
started to accelerate in 1986, when Gorbachov denied to the Communist 
Party the monopoly of truth. 'We need democracy as much as the air to 
breathe' - that is the contrary of dictatorship of the proletariat, pro­
claimed by a man who was still General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, but who basically assumed a social-democratic 
position and anticipated which way in the history of the labour movement 
had prevailed historically
Concern about the Soviet Union has been replaced by concern for the 
Soviet Union. This fantastic shift characterizes the end of an epoch, that 
started in 1917 with the October revolution and ended with the peaceful 
revolution of August 1991.
In this connection I would like to express my fear of false hopes and 
illusionary expectations, that have emerged in the West as to the devel­
opment of the former Soviet Union. Ultimately, democracy sees the hu­
man being in its centre with his strengths and weaknesses, that is why it is 
so elastic-flexible and successful; people in Moscow and Leningrad have 
prevented the putsch. They found men in Yelzin and Sobtschak, who be­
came speakers and executors of their will at the right moment. The ele­
mentary will for democracy has not yet created democratic structures. 
The vacuum of power lying in the streets was filled with decrees. So far 
Yelzin has not forgotten what he learned from Lenin. I don't want to dis­
cuss here the subject of how the new structure of the former empire will 
be construed. But I cannot imagine any democratic stability without polit­
ical parties calculable within government or opposition and capable of 
taking responsibilities. After the miserable and - measured by its own 
claims - shameful resignation from history of the CPSU a vacuum has 
occurred that cannot be filled by 150 parties.
In such a situation a strong hand is demanded. Authority against chaos 




























































































democratic structures comfortable. This tradition is even older than 
Bolshevism in Russia.
Are we facing dictatorship for introducing democracy right now? This 
question might seem absurd to western thinking. On the other hand, 
something similar has already functioned in Nigeria. It could well be that 
this is the only way resulting from Russian tradition, which is not a 
democratic one, as tsardom was no democracy and neither Stolypin nor 
the Duma had left behind lasting traces.
What Gorbachov has begun, was a revolution from above. He started it 
knowing that without decisive reforms the Soviet Union would lose its 
race against America. During the first discussion I had with him in April 
1985, a few weeks only after he assumed office, I was deeply impressed 
by the depth of his recognition that wars were no longer winnable, that 
disarmament had therefore become possible, without endangering the se­
curity of his country. That was, by the way, the main argument by which 
he was able to convince the reluctant militaries. Common security for 
East and West should become the foundation on which economic reforms, 
i.e. Perestroika, would develop. In our conversation Gorbachov's 
conviction emerged very clearly, that Glasnost, i.e. freedom of expressing 
one's opinion, would be the lever to burst the incrustations of Stalinism, 
in order to set free the communist idea so that it would have full scope 
for developing its vigour. Of course, a reformator, who wanted to be a 
heretic no more than Luther, had to refer to Lenin but Gorbachov 
himself wanted to return to Lenin, that means, he was a communist 
believing in the reform capacity of the idea.
In this connection it is important that the people who are engaged in the 
revolution from above are imprinted by the communist way of thinking 
and by the experience of the system; that is true for Yelzin as much as for 
Shevardnadse or Yakovlev. Even the man of the new generation, 
Sobschak, who cannot look back on more than one year in the Party, has 
experience of life and the corresponding categories of thinking of a 
typical Soviet and not those of western democrats. He is a child of the 
Soviet Union. The mentality of the revolutionaries from above is not 
shaped by the west and they cannot get it however much they might look 
westward.
For the revolution from below, that has not at all took place during the 
first years, this is even more true: it was not the case that the masses felt 
freed after the proclamation of Perestroika and Glasnost and could finally 
let their initiatives sparkle like champaign which can no longer be tamed 
by a cork.
During his visit to Moscow this summer President Bush, in view of the 
past, has renounced offering magic formulas to his host taking account of 
the past. He said instead: 'You must find your own kind of democratic 




























































































statement towards Gorbachov is also valid for all democratic successors 
of the former Soviet Union.
We experience daily in Germany what kind of damages the system has 
caused in the thinking and behaviour of men. The citizens of the GRD, 
who are not separated by linguistic barriers and who are fixed on the old 
Federal Republic and familiar with tv and radio programs and thus with 
advertising and problems of prosperity, demonstrate as citizens of the 
Federal Republic how hard they find the reorientation of mentality. Self- 
responsibility instead of waiting for instructions, risk instead of incon­
spicuous precaution characterize alternatives of the break. Under the 
former system they said: I want, because I must; the key to success is 
now: I must, because I want. Self-responsibility instead of adaptability - 
East Germans find this break in mentality very hard. But how much 
harder it must be for the Polish, Czechs, but also Lithuanians or 
Estonians, who were not that close to and familiar with the West? But 
these people have a collective memory of a former democracy which the 
peoples of the Soviet Union cannot have. Not drawing attention and ex­
ercising caution, wait and see and be careful, these were the rules of 
survival proved to be good for centuries. It is completely impossible to 
alter mentality in a very short time. We must not expect superhuman 
things of people who have suffered so much.
That means also that in foreseeable future we must not expect a situa­
tion, neither politically nor economically, measured by the usual criteria 
of West-European states. For a long time the state's corridor in the for­
mer Soviet Union will remain much broader. Areas controlled by the 
government economically, will comprise not only aviation and railways 
and postal service, but also raw materials and key industries. The stratum 
of middle management does not exist and the upper management is quite 
scarce. The private sector of enterprise will grow from below and from 
above there should be something growing towards them.
Anyway, as far as I am concerned, till 1995 I do not expect any com­
parable democratic party structure in the former Soviet Union and till the 
year 2000 no economic structure comparable with Western Europe.
This implies, as to our help, that we cannot make assistance dependent 
on the establishment of comparable market economic structures. This 
would resemble the position of a man, who will throw the safety belt to 
the drowning only after he has learned how to swim.
There is another factor: supra-national collaboration instead of purely 
national independency is the progress of Western Europe. Of course, 
there still exist national interests, but they are no more the focal point of 
the nations. In other words, the interests of Italy, France and Spain and 
even of Great Britain are better off within the European Community than 
without. Freedom, prosperity and security are no longer obtainable 




























































































to be the case. There, nation is the focal point, in order to obtain freedom 
and security against the centre and its oppression, combined even with the 
hope of gaining prosperity that way. The Soviet Union had frozen its 
national conflicts hoping that the bacillus would die in a social order 
where not only classes but also nationalities no longer played any role. 
The end of the system shows clearly that the nationalities' genes have 
survived the deep freeze box. They have remained most alive, including 
arrogance, stupidity and even their closeness to fascism.
National identity as the most important reference point belongs to the 
19th century. A big problem of the Soviet peoples will be solved if they 
recognize that their national interests are best taken care of in a suprana­
tional structure, from a security point of view as well as from the per­
spective of economic progress.
Here Western Europe can help, first by transmitting our experience, 
but even more by the readiness to welcome the peoples of the huge 
country in Europe. If we refuse this, we confine and isolate them and 
would be co-responsible for nationalist clashes, after the former clinch of 
the central state with its valid although imposed ideology has been abol­
ished without replacement. The reference even for Soviet nationalists can 
only be Europe. What else? The collapse of the centre and the break­
down of the autocratic party with its values cultivated in 70 years of 
power have left behind a vacuum. Into this vacuum the nation will rush, 
more precisely the dozens of opposing nations, if it cannot be filled with 
European principles. German 'Ostpolitik' was based on the principle that 
self-determination of the German people had to come second to the inter­
est in securing peace. German and European interests were identical.
We had the satisfaction of seeing this principle been taken adopted al­
most word by word in the final act of Helsinki: renunciation of force for 
the modification of borders, and furthermore human rights, rights of 
minorities and ethnic groups. Renunciation of force must remain the 
principal European law, for the Soviet peoples, too, and all national 
ambitions have to be subordinate in the interest of stability which these 
peoples need even more urgently than Europe. But this presumes that the 
Charter of Paris remains valid, which mean so to speak, that Europe em­
braces Russia and does not reject it.
Whether this will function is most uncertain. New putsch attempts are 
improbable today, but cannot be excluded definitely tomorrow and the 
patchwork carpet of nations is much more colourful and complicated in 
Russia than in Yugoslavia.
It means demanding a lot at one go: very briefly the Soviet people have 
to become market-economy-orientated democrats and citizens who mea­
sure their conduct by European and not national standards.
To achieve this in a short lapse of time requires a majority of super­




























































































to find its own way in a political structure and an economic organization; 
Europe could only help to avoid the national conflicts, if it brings the 
European perspective within reach.
Besides the problems of its internal development resulting from tradi­
tion and mentality, the country will have to solve the question of its gov­
ernmental structure. Here, we will essentially be observers only. From a 
European point of view it is evident that this country should remain 
united as far as possible, except for Republics like Georgia, Armenia and 
Moldavia and the Baltic States, that means, it should retain a central 
competence, which would make it easier to solve problems of security and 
economic questions.
As to the issue of security, it is clear that all the Republics respect the 
obligations resulting from contracts concluded so far by the Soviet Union, 
and it is equally clear that further disarmament will become the more 
complicated the more new sovereign Republics have to balance or take 
into consideration their own interests towards Russia.
Our economic interest is obvious, too. After all, the main support will 
be coming from Europe and not from America. For 70 years, the infras­
tructure has been developed according to the common interests of the 
Soviet Union. It does not really matter that Georgia is producing essen­
tially wine and for instance is getting its telephones from one of the Baltic 
Republics, which produces 70% of all the telephones in the Soviet Union. 
Political self-determination does not automatically lead to economic 
autarky.
Which kind of economic perspectives has a country, which is producing 
mainly wine and is hoping for payment in Western European currency, 
where - as we know - they also produce some wine. We are familiar with 
drinking in Russia, but drinking for Russia would be something new!
The American interest sounds quite different: the more states the Soviet 
Union has, the less danger for us, Henry Kissinger says, because each 
centralistic state would develop expansionism again. That is why he 
wishes as much decentralization as possible. That reminds us of a general, 
who after a war is reflecting on the next one and wants to avoid the 
mistakes of the last one. While America might still see some strategic ri­
valry with the strategic power of Moscow, there is none of this kind for 
Europe any more. Europe has no global rivalry with the new Union. Now 
that the German question had been solved, the Russian question has 
emerged for Europe. The Europeans are concerned about Soviet risks, 
which are less vital for America because two oceans separate them from 
the protagonists of risks.
It must not be leadership that Europe claims against the new Soviet 
Union, but European interests are nevertheless strong enough not to 
submit to US leadership, if these American interests will determine the 




























































































litical situation in Europe that between Russia and the former West, states 
have emerged whose governments are legitimated by elections and orien­
tate themselves towards the West.
When the European Community, or more exactly, the Western 
European Community, was founded, a seat was reserved there for these 
states and they were promised that they would take their seat the very 
moment they obtained their self-determination.
Now they can and they want to, although nobody has the necessary 
money to finance the quick entry of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
into the Common Market, but these countries need a transitional period 
different from the GDR. So it was right that the Federal Government 
helped them to have the perspective of becoming a member of the 
European Community. All handicaps to economic collaboration expressed 
by the COCOM list have to be abolished at once, because these countries 
and former potential opponents have now become partners and allies of 
free democracy.
Economically these countries want a market system; politically this 
means the same orientation as the one we know from the EFTA-countries, 
but starting from much worse conditions. They move towards the 
Common Market and must not be refused, as we want democracy to suc­
ceed there as we had wanted it in Spain, Portugal and Greece. All doubts 
against their accession are untenable. Whether this economic Europe will 
get together with different difficulties, in varying intensity or step by step 
by association, is now less important than the knowledge that Common 
Europe has come into being now.
All plans that lose the perspective of all-Europe would be built on sand. 
Insofar nothing will be as it was before, or in other words: due to the 
European division Western Europe was able to be an 'Isle of Happiness', 
which turned its back on the East and cared only for raising its living 
standards and prosperity. Now we realize in Germany how costly it is, to 
try to help our East on their way to the same prosperity we have in the 
West, although it is in fact not that expensive after all. This experience the 
Western European Community will make globally. If we are not prepared 
to renounce any further increase of living standards for a while, it is not 
even mathematically possible that the East will ever catch up with us. And 
if that is not the case, the people, who have moved so much already, will 
start to move more. Then the principles of a constitutional state will be 
required in order to solve the problem. Shall we use weapons and build 
up effective border barriers, after the western request for freedom of 
movement has succeeded triumph? Cuts in prosperity, changes of our 
constitution or closing down the borders? In principle one can say, that in 
Germany nobody wants any of these three alternatives. The promise of 
free movement could turn out to be hypocrisy or stupidity. Stupidity can 




























































































solved than by a policy, by which the people in the East gain trustworthy 
confidence that remaining home will be worthwhile? Maybe this could be 
combined with quotas for immigration agreed on the level of the EC.
That must not and will not handicap Western Europe to push forward 
its projects of becoming union and implement them as planned. We shall 
have to develop a Europe of different intensities: the old European 
Community, as the centre, a second circle of variably dense associations 
including the Baltic Republics and finally the countries of the former 
Soviet Union, collaborating with the perspective of an all-European eco­
nomic area.
Without delay we should now start to envisage negotiating all-European 
structures in the field of energy, traffic links, communications, common 
environmental regulations and - last but not least - a European Institute of 
Standardization. Standardization might be one decisive factor for 
economic cooperation.
At the end of the East-West conflict a new situation has occurred from 
a security policy point of view. Conventionally the Soviet Union is no 
longer a threat. In the next two decades no attack is imaginable, of the 
kind that NATO feared up to yesterday. NATO has only a very small 
border to Russia, in Northern Norway. Furthermore, NATO's member 
countries are surrounded by a circle of states - from Norway to the east­
ern border of Turkey - which direct their view and hopes to the West.
This means that Europe does not need any longer the physical presence 
of American troops to defend itself conventionally. And - by the way - 
Europe would still have the benefit of the American strategic weapons, 
even if America were no longer physically present.
But for political and psychological reasons we require the American 
presence, though without its security political dominance. It is unaccept­
able for Europe and America as well, if with a fraction of their present 
troops the United States dominate the future security structures, as if 
Europe were unable to do this on its own. In my Institute we had inter­
esting discussions with an official American, who said the same as the 
former Foreign Minister Henry Kissinger, that it is neither desirable nor 
possible for America to maintain its former dominating position in 
Europe.
A self-determined Europe can welcome American troops also under 
European leadership. The strategic nuclear competence would remain 
unaltered as before, but America will have to make up its mind, if it will 
remain in Europe only under the condition of leading the alliance. Europe 
must no longer be afraid to ask this question, as the design of a European 
house wishing to have America as a fellow-lodger has to be performed by 
European architects.
The competence of NATO reaches as far as the Polish border, and the 




























































































alliance always intended to avoid, but nobody is worried about it. After 
their retreat no foreign troops will enter this region and the German 
troops in East Germany, being under exclusively German authority so 
far, will then be fully integrated into NATO. The alliance will then be­
come for our Eastern neighbours a guarantee factor for security against 
Germany. The sovereign advance concession of the Chancellor to reduce 
the German troops to 370.000 soldiers has gone ahead of the Vienna 
Conference and has thus fulfilled the classical purpose of an advance con­
cession: others will follow with considerable reductions of their troops.
The suggestions of the NATO ministers of defence concerning the de­
velopment of new air-based missiles are within the decades-long continu­
ity of American interests to dispose over nuclear weapons able to reach 
the Soviet Union without needing to use strategic weapons. This repre­
sents the continuation of old confrontative imaginations, even if the ar­
gumentation pretends that provisions have to be made against a missile 
threat from the developing countries in the South, that does not even exist 
so far. If this were confirmed by the Government chiefs, it is easy to 
imagine the Soviet answer; it could create not only a new potential threat 
for West Europe, but a renaissance of the just ended confrontation.
This is the really important decision to be taken by forthcoming 
summits: is there a new issue of a potential enemy or all-European col­
laboration in the field of security too; will the Charter of Paris be taken 
seriously or will it be broken only a few months after its signature; will 
the borders of the European split be overcome or only be pushed further 
east; will Europe be freed or become a prisoner of continued confronta­
tion under the motto 'second to none'?
It belongs to the changed security situation that the aimed-for conven­
tional balance between East and West has been reached on paper, but lost 
in reality, as the German separation does not exist any more, on top of 
which this balance has been calculated. The Warsaw Pact got lost. It ex­
isted just long enough to sign The Paris Treaty and to be formally dis­
solved four months later with the striking result, that the Eastern superi­
ority existing so far has been replaced by a Western superiority towards 
the Soviet Union. 30 divisions are missing on the Eastern side of the bal­
ance. That was never intended, but is a fact.
From a potential deployment zone against the West the three East- 
Middle-European states have become a security zone in favour of the 
West, if one thinks in old east-west categories, but this is exactly what we 
must not do. What are they then? Neutral? Even though they strive for 
Western social and economic systems, and historically neutrality has lost 
its sense at the end of the East-West conflict?
It is understandable, if NATO hesitates or refuses to give guarantees 
for these countries which the Soviet Union might consider as a threat. If 




























































































only be an intermediate stage comparable to the situation in East 
Germany, as long as Soviet troops exist. This security-political floating 
condition, which could be called a vacuum, can not be lasting. If a west­
ern decision can not be taken against and without these countries, this 
means practically, that Prague, Budapest and Warsaw put the decisive 
weight on the balance for future European security structures most cer­
tainly as soon as Germany discovers its security interests being identical 
with those of the mentioned countries.
Doubtlessly this would be the case, if after the suggestion by the NATO 
ministers of defence the Soviets would give a classical answer. Because 
then not only Germany and Denmark, but also Poland, Hungary and the 
CSFR would encounter a new, identical potential threat. The real 
situation, the real interests of these European countries will develop their 
normative force. That means either the three above-mentioned Middle- 
East-European countries get into some kind of relation to NATO, in fact 
a guarantee relation, or an all-European security structure will be created 
including the Soviet Union. If these countries cannot and must not be 
stopped in their drive for the West, the political perspective will be 
against the Soviet Union or at least without the Soviet Union or with the 
Soviet Union. The answer is not difficult, as long as we stick to the 
Charter of Paris.
This is probably the really far-reaching decision of these months: does 
Europe remain America-orientated from security policy point of view, or 
does it find the force for self-determination? This matter will be decided 
by Germany. The well-liked 'as well as', by which Bonn has helped itself 
over the past decades, would practically mean a decision in favour of 
America, which pursues its security-political interests until today with all 
attributes of apparent sovereignty and with admirable continuity - 
admittedly: as well as comfortable. But if not now, that the Soviet Union 
is neither enemy nor opponent, when then should Europe's emancipation 
take place of an America, without whose help Europe would never have 
obtained the chance to emancipate, take place?
If not now, in a state of maximum weakness of the Soviet Union and of 
maximum power of the United States, when should Europe ever live 
without America's guardianship, which even America itself does not want 
to assume forever?
Europe has to treat the Soviet Union as a European partner and Europe 
can do this precisely because America remains the global strategic partner 
of Moscow.
This will have consequences on the considerations concerning a new 
NATO doctrine. Should we abandon the defence doctrine in favour of an 
intervention doctrine? Should the undenied readiness for defence be 
complemented by the readiness to interfere outside the alliance? In the 




























































































Near East, in one of these regions or globally undefined? Such a doctrine 
would change fundamentally the character of the alliance. Loyalty 
towards its present values would exclude in my opinion the German 
consent to such changements. Especially if it is performed invariably 
under American leadership and NATO would thus become an instrument 
of global American interests. Each doubt or refusal to participate in 
interventions would be turned into a question of reliability and 
faithfulness towards the alliance.
As soon as these two questions have been decided upon: all-Europe and 
European self-determination, all problems can be solved that are now still 
existing in confusing profusion. Among them the discussion concerning 
the WEU, which is not a real woman, but an artificial figure-head: it has 
no structure, no command, no troops and will not be able to get all this, if 
it does not want to blow up NATO.
A WEU as a debating club for political coordination of the Europeans 
would not compensate for its defects, but would increase the animosities 
of the Americans who would feel excluded. On the other hand the WEU 
is a child of the Cold War and of confrontation, not less than NATO. It 
has to face the same problem of including Eastern Europe in its thinking, 
and not as an object. Whether NATO or WEU will be organized without 
considering Eastern Europe, does not make any difference politically. It 
is not a matter of chance that the cautious interests of 
Middle-East-European countries regarding contact, collaboration, coor­
dination will reach the alliance as well as the WEU without formal guar­
antees. If Europe's self-determination shall not have an anti-American 
drive, it is advisable to restructure NATO in order to make it an alliance 
under European leadership including France and with an American pres­
ence. If East Europe, more precisely the Soviet Union, was defined as out 
of area, rebellion would be appropriate, because Germany must not break 
the Charter of Paris. It would not be in our interest to torpedo the CSCE 
process. NATO is an alliance of states but no state's alliance not entitled to 
decide somehow sovereignly about interventions outside of its area, 
whereas the smaller ships of the European armada would have to follow 
the battle-ship USA.
We shall see whether NATO will not be able to devise its strategy in 
coordination with the East and go about its planning in cooperation with 
the East in such a way that an extension including the Soviet Union will 
no longer be an utopia, but will become a real prospect.
This would be a possibility, which may be faster to realize than the de­
velopment of all-European structures from the CSCE, which would re­
main the only alternative, if NATO shuts itself off or continues develop­
ing confrontational features.
This problem becomes quite clear in connection with Yugoslavia: how 




























































































has to be admitted that Europe is not at all prepared for such problems. 
This is all the less a reproach as the entire international community, in­
cluding the United Nations, is not prepared for it. The problem has 
erupted at the end of the Gulf War triggered by the unfortunate Kurds, 
who are living in five different states: the Soviet Union, Turkey, Syria, 
Iraq and Iran. Such problems are not new of course. Collective shame is 
appropriate, as the world accepts for years a war containing racial and 
religious elements against the black peoples of South Sudan. Issues that 
TV is not interested in obviously do not receive any priority in the States' 
Chancelleries. In the case of the Kurds the world was conscience-stricken.
Massive violations of human rights can no longer be hidden behind the 
barriers of state sovereignty. Since our world is as it is, we are experi­
encing the world's enthusiasm under the motto: long live the people's self- 
determination! Precisely in Germany, which was able to put into practice 
its right of self-determination, this tendency is especially big. The world 
would drown in chaos, if the principle of'Self-determination Vber Alles' 
would replace the principle of 'Germany Vber Alles'. There is no 
definition of how many souls a people must count with their own 
language and identity, in order to be entitled to claim self-determination 
with governmental independence. Anyway, no different standard can be 
applied to Nagorny Karabach than to Northern Ireland, nor can we 
submit the Evenks in far-away Siberia to different rules than the near-by 
Tirolians.
Whether and if so when the principle so far embodied as the interna­
tional right of sovereign states will be modified by the right to self-de­
termination of peoples is an open question, which I cannot answer. It 
applies also to the United Nations, because the answer has to be accepted 
by the community of sovereign states which is changing the Charter of the 
United Nations in order to enable them to accept the new right. Just 
because we do not have any structure in Europe, in which the right of 
veto is embodied, it could well be that Europe will find an answer to it 
within the CSCE earlier than the United Nations. This is a big field for 
urgent academic and political research.
In the Charter of Paris the CSCE had just decided upon a very weak 
system of crisis management when we were surprised by the civil war in 
Yugoslavia. Not even an office was functioning in Prague. Whoever loads 
a baby with a knapsack, must not be astonished if the baby collapses. The 
fact that CSCE is not yet able to carry such a knapsack provokes 
injustified public astonishment and criticism. Now crisis management in 
Yugoslavia has been delegated to the European Community, because - 
very wisely - a corresponding majority decision by the CSCE cannot be 
blocked by veto. After all, the European Community has well-functioning 
mechanisms, even though they are as little designed and prepared to settle 




























































































European Community thus resembles a trainee doctor who is expected to 
operate on a perforated appendix.
Without wanting to decide on or expecting an economic boycott aiming 
at the complete isolation of Yugoslavia - which by the way the European 
Community cannot do on its own, since Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria 
would have to participate - one is struck by the idea of considering the use 
of military force. That is very old thinking, indeed.
Who should employ this force? The CSCE has not a command structure 
and troops of its own at its disposal. If one day it should come so far, the 
CSCE intervention troops would become an instrument of enforcing the 
law valid within the Community. If NATO forms such intervention 
forces, this would be an instrument for out of area interventions. The 
same applies to the Western European Union (WEU), which would have 
to rent such troops from NATO. The question of an international legal 
basis for interventions outside NATO and WEU territory would of course 
imply the problem whether one should also intervene elsewhere in the 
East, where - as already indicated - many Yugoslavias are in store.
So what will happen if there are civil wars or wars between one or the 
other of the new republics of the former Soviet Union? During the era of 
the East-West confrontation this was easy to handle. Both sides respected 
the status quo, each side was responsible for tilling and preserving order 
in its own yard. In the case of the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
there were strong and justified protests, but - as 12 years earlier in 
Hungary - nothing happened. Under the cover of bloc stability there was 
room for neutrality or a position of non-alignment, or even more: the 
neutral states took advantage of the security guaranteed by both alliances. 
After the end of the East-West conflict it has become meaningless. The 
end of the confrontation has also eroded neutrality.
Of course, in the past, as now, we were not indifferent to events in 
Eastern Europe, but up to now there has been no legal basis for the West 
to draw upon, if it should want to intervene.
One should not pretend that there was already a European home with 
corresponding house rules and a caretaker paid by all members. In case of 
wars in the former Warsaw Pact-countries there is only the UN with its 
instruments of using force.
The CSCE is not a ratified treaty, but a formulated intention, which has 
brought about significant political effects with a view to their becoming 
valid under international law, but which must still be converted into a 
treaty.
There are two pillars on which a future stable Europe must rest. The 
first pillar is the renunciation of force as a mean of modifying existing 
borders; the second one is the right of minorities and peoples within the 




























































































History cannot be undone. When we debated the Munich Treaty 20 
years ago, Prague demanded from us a statement that it had been unvalid 
from the start. We could not give such a statement. It was injustice from 
the beginning, but even Czechoslovakia will of course not reverse the ex­
pulsion of more than one million Sudeten-Germans, which occurred at the 
end of the war. The same is true for the Poles who live in Lithuania or 
the Russians in Latvia or the Armenians in Azerbaijan or the Croats in 
Serbia or the Serbs in Bosnia. It is known already today that at the end of 
the civil war in Yugoslavia living side by side and the mixing of diverse 
ethnic groups and minorities will continue, no matter whether existing 
borders remain or are modified on a consensual basis.
In Europe, in the East as well as in the West, nation and nationality may 
no longer be number one on the priority list of political values or 
structures. Historically speaking this is the test and the chance for Europe 
after the end of the East-West conflict, for a Europe that wishes to attain 
self-determination.
3. Germany After the End of the East-West Conflict
I would like to introduce the subject of Germany after the end of the 
East-West conflict by saying something about the development which has 
led to German Unity.
To begin with, it is a fact, that the West Germans did not insist upon the 
unification. There was no impatience. In the old Federal Republic ev­
erybody lived comfortably and was speaking about 'brothers and sisters', 
sent parcels visited one another and regretted, that history had put them 
on the wrong side. We did not have any plans. One year after the begin­
ning of the constitutional Unity, it can be seen almost daily how little we 
were prepared. Three weeks after the Berlin Wall fell on 9th November 
1989 - the person behind the decision still remains an open question - the 
Federal Chancellor offered to his colleague, Modrow, the possibility of 
negotiations concerning a contractual alliance that should lead to confed- 
erational structures. On 3rd December 1989, nobody ever thought, that 
the first all-German elections would take place just one year later.
The people in the East wanted the Unity. This is quite understandable. 
For the smaller part, the more afflicted part, it was crucial, for the very 
reason, that after the fall of the Wall, a mass exodus began towards the 
West, and nobody could stop it, neither the Americans, the French, the 
British nor the Soviets. The German people in the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) had forced the Unity.
In spring 1990, the Federal Chancellor recognized the situation easily 
enough and reacted with real courage. Courage, insofar as he literally 




























































































in breach of international law: he negotiated the Unity with the Soviet 
Union and decided, together with Gorbachov, security-political conditions 
for the German Unity. Gorbachov was clever enough - or weak enough - 
to do the inevitable, and preferred to offer it to the Germans, rather than 
give it to the three Western powers. These powers could do nothing but 
applaud a Unity whose establishment had been their declared goal, until 
then, an unkept promise.
Basically, the Two-plus-Four negotiations were only a confirmation 
and formal execution of reserved rights or the rest of original rights, 
which had terminated the sovereignty of the German Reich with the un­
conditional surrender in May 1945.
In international law, Germany only obtained its sovereignty this year, 
following the ratification of the Two-plus-Four Agreement in March.
Security for Germany, and security against Germany were two aspects 
equally valid of the epoch of separation and determined by the separation. 
The same aspects apply to the Unity. As such it is comforting to see that 
something very important has remained unchanged, given that so many 
others have altered.
Gorbachov accepted the extension of NATO up to the Polish border, as 
NATO meant control over the German forces, and thus security for the 
Eastern neighbours of Germany. Kohl accepted, that foreign troops 
would not enter East German territory, even after the retreat of the 
Soviet Army in 1994, and in an unilateral advance concession an un­
precedented decision - he agreed to the reduction of the German troops to 
370.000 men. In no less superior style, he took over social democratic 
requests which he had resolutely fought against until then: the Social 
Democratic Party had endorsed the requests of the Palme-Commission for 
a nuclear weapon-free corridor in Germany, in order to obtain a nuclear 
weapon-free strip reaching from the North Cape down to the 
Mediterranean Sea. This now will become reality, as will freedom of 
chemical weapons, although there still does not exist a banning treaty with 
worldwide validity.
So, whilst the foreign and security policy aspect of the German Unity 
can be considered a unparalleled success story, the internal and economic 
are complete disasters so far, but nevertheless condemned to success.
It was Chancellor Kohl's mistake to introduce the D-Mark over night, 
from first July 1990 and without any economic provision. All experts had 
warned him of the consequences which have since occurred. We had 
given the Spanish and British economy years to prepare themselves for 
the fresh wind of the Common Market, whereas the GDR economy is ex­
pected to perform over night, an impossible prospect. The whole of 
Eastern trade of the GDR has broken down, as - obvious -none of the 
COMECON-countries was able to pay in 'hard' currency. GDR produc­




























































































Trabant. Even the agricultural production has been directly affected, be­
cause the East Germans believed that a Western egg was better than an 
Eastern egg and the East Berliners preferred rolls from West Berlin.
A lot of money was needed in order to compensate all that. When 
Lafontaine was speaking of one billion of DM a year ago, he was believed 
to be crazy, not only because this sum seemed to be incredibly high, but 
also because he was saying it during the election campaign. At the same 
time, the Chancellor promised no tax increases and to the new 
compatriots, that no one would be worse off, but better off. During the 
past 12 months 140 billions of DM have been transferred, tax has been 
increased and unemployment in Eastern Germany has not even reached its 
peak so far.
The early introduction of market economy in countries with a planned 
economy is terribly expensive. To request a radical move towards market 
economy, pushes a country to disaster, not only because it does not have a 
rich 'big brother’, but also because all the available money of the 
industrial states would not suffice for the countries of the former Soviet 
Union to attain a level comparable to the transfer into the former GDR.
Something else can be learned from the German experience to date: the 
physical removal of the Berlin Wall has not yet removed 'the wall’ in the 
people's minds. In the West, many people think of tax increases, in the 
East, many feel that the Western people are condescending. In the West, 
they think that the Easterners should at least work. In the East, one points 
out that they had at least had some work to do before, and that they had 
attained a better living standard than their Eastern neighbours. In the 
West one might easily find everything from the East miserable, and in the 
East they say it was not that bad after all. Of course, I have simplified the 
problem, but the fact is: after the unification a divided nation has 
emerged, instead of a separated country. In the meantime, we see in 
Germany, something that can be seen in Europe and all over the world; 
proprietary rights and the all-consuming desire to change everybody else 
except, for oneself. This kind of attitude cannot prevail.
Capacities and interests determine what a country is able to do or wants 
to provoke. But the foreign political weight of a country is based on its 
interior political strength. It begins with the stability of its constitution, a 
minimum of social political consensus and economic power. That is where 
the difficulties of the Federal Republic start, and they are precisely 
created by the Unity we have always wanted. A country, which used to be 
a stronghold of stability with 60 million inhabitants, considering that 
there have been only 6 chancellors, a low number of strikes and low 
inflation rate, now has to face completely new conditions with an in­
creased population of 76 millions inhabitants.
With unemployment approaching 50% in one part of the country, and 




























































































daily instable country. In the light of these factors, the difficulties are 
compounded by the mental melting process between both parts of the 
country, which leads to growing animosiues towards each other. I there­
fore come to the first conclusion:
The creation of interior Unity takes absolute priority over all other 
factors. Even if the new East-German countries do not become a flour­
ishing landscape in the next three years, equality of rights and chances 
reaching equality as far as wages, salaries and pensions are concerned, 
have to be implemented during the current legisladon period, if we want 
to avoid a long-lasdng traumadc and divided mentality in my nadon. One 
could express this as follows: the return to stability and a minimum social 
polidcal consensus is the priority task of German policy.
This implies also an internal reconciliation. Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
has said in his Government declaration: 'To accept this is especially diffi­
cult for those who have suffered, but without reconciliation, we would 
only rebuild and consolidate the walls, that have been pulled down in our 
thinking’. I also share this opinion. It includes the idea that even the 
principle 'justice, not revenge’ has to be buried. I am thoroughly con­
vinced, that no good will come for my people, if legal authorities are oc­
cupied until far into the next century with clearing up individual injus­
tices, which have been committed or suffered, without ultimately being 
able to obtain full justice. No good can result from letting the past or even 
the Stasi or any other secret service poison our future. Not only mercy, 
but also reconciliation goes before justice, and even if this once again will 
spare hangers-on and opportunists. This is the price to be paid for 
reconciliation.
Reconciliation is easy with equal-minded people or among friends 
having had minor differences. But reconciliation is difficult between op­
ponents and strangers, or those who snubbed each other or even fought 
against each other. But that is where reconciliation is required most of all.
The reconciliation of Germany demands equality of opportunities and a 
firm promise not to penalise any people who have not committed wrongs 
nor caused harm for which they should go to court, unless they have 
committed a very serious crime. We should be open to all those people, in 
order to give them the chance to start anew politically.
Practically speaking, this will not be a problem for people who are still 
resolute Communists today or who want to preserve their ideals, who do 
not want to run away from their past, out of pride or self-esteem, even if 
they doubt it secretly. I have a high respect for such people.
On the contrary, we shall have to deal with fellow countrymen, who 
either started to doubt earlier and feel free right now, but want to find 
out what can be saved from the old ideals in the new era, people, if you 
like, who did belong to the conservatives in the former GDR and now 




























































































For me there is only one requirement: democracy, as the political will 
of a majority is the aim of Social Democracy. Freedom, Unity and soli­
darity are basic values to be balanced in each new situation, but as the 
guidelines of all our decisions. No matter where they are from, be it 
Leninism-Marxism, the Sermon on the Mount, or the ethics of 
Enlightenment, as soon as one agrees with democracy and the basic pro­
gram, one would be able to become a member of the SPD. The tradition 
of tolerance demands the chance of a new start for everyone, who is 
willing to comply with it. That means reconciliation, is the part of Unity 
or unification, which can and should be offered openly by the Social 
Democratic Party to our people. Both, the Christian Democrats (CDU) 
and the Liberals (FDP) have now assumed similar positions. Anything 
else does not make sense.
After the War, no other principle was applied. I felt disgusted when 
Adenauer became the Commentator of the Nuremberg Laws' Chief of the 
Chancellery, but for sure it was a sign of integration and it was appealing 
to voters. Should Eastern Germans be judged more harshly 40 years later, 
after all the difficulties they have encountered? The Tribunals of the four 
winners do not exist any longer. We shall have to judge ourselves, how 
Germany is going to treat Honecker if Moscow frees him, or how to deal 
with the successful former head of intelligence, Markus Wolf, after he 
surrendered to the authorities.
The principles of a constitutional state are applicable; nobody can be 
sentenced by laws which are not applicable to him or her. Honecker has 
not betrayed the GDR. There is no penalty without law. It is doubtful if 
our criminal law is able to judge political guilt.
The head of the intelligence service does not become guilty when he is 
doing his job according to law; this applies to all authorities worldwide. 
So far nobody can prove the contrary, in Markus Wolfs case, when he 
says: 'My hands are not stained with blood.' Anyone who has worked for 
him in the GDR or has been sent to the West by him, cannot be harmed; 
on the other hand, a West German, who has worked for him in the old 
Federal Republic, has committed treason as a spy, and must be con­
demned. It is a long way to Unity and justice!
Four frontier soldiers are on trial under the charge of having killed 
men, who tried to get over the Wall, although the four soldiers were 
following firing orders confirmed by the Warsaw Treaty member states. 
Shall the big shots remain unmolested and the little men be hanged?
We cannot dismiss all judges and teachers in East Germany. We have 
not even decided upon an attempt to write a German post-war history, 
which can be taught in all schools. No individual can be condemned be­
latedly for not being a hero. This applies to authors, priests, scientists, 
opportunists, as well as dissidents among them, who - like most others - 




























































































These are some of the problems of the Unity, but to be quite clear: 
scarcely nobody wants to go back to the separation. On that point, there is 
entire agreement in the West and the East.
During the final months of the GDR, I worked there as a consultant in 
the Defence Ministry and tried to help solving the tremendously compli­
cated task of merging two armies into one German Army. The two 
armies were built up in opposition to each other and integrated into op­
posing alliances. It was quite strange, indeed. In former times, I would 
have been arrested, if I merely for approaching the building; yet I had an 
office there and the Generals of the National Peoples' Army (NPA) re­
ported to me. The State Security Service, the Communist Party and the 
National People's Army seemed to be a troika of terror before; at closer 
view it could be seen that the State Security Service had become the sinis­
ter apparatus, which was maintaining a state with a ruling Party, a 
Government and Troops, consisting of officers who felt 51% as Germans 
and only 49% as Communists, who were even proud of having returned 
more independency from the Soviet Union than their Federal Army 
comrades did against the Americans. I was able to realize that GDR in­
telligence concerning the western forces, including the weak points of our 
defence, was so detailed and precise, that it did not need any correction 
after the fall of the Wall, whereas it was, only after the fall of the Wall 
that the Federal Army came across departments and units whose existence 
and names they had never heard of before.
It was an ambition and a question of pride for the NPA to transmit 
their troops to the Federal Army in good order, in the hope of being 
treated with dignity and equal rights. The fusing of the troops did not 
turn out to become the big model it might have been for the interior 
Unity. Everybody in the rank of general or admiral was dismissed, al­
though it would have been possible to reinsert some of them - carefully 
selected - into the Federal Army. We did not have bad experiences by 
entrusting the building-up of the Federal Army to generals who had 
loyally served the Fiihrer and the Chancellor of the Reich before. Many 
officers of the National People's Army did not get the chance of demo­
cratic probation in their profession, although some of them were engaged 
as civil consultants afterwards. On the other hand, it is understandable 
that high-ranking officers of the old Federal Army just could not imagine 
their sons being commanded by former officers of the NPA. Yet, this is 
exactly what is required, if one wants to speak of integration, of a new 
Army, of real Unity, and precisely this is now appearing although on a 
low level.
At present huge weapon and equipment deposits have to be guarded, 
among them 1.200 tanks. The Baltic Sea contains the biggest marine 
cemetery in the world with 80 battle ships. It will take ten years to de­




























































































Next to the Soviet Army, the National People's Army was the best- 
equipped, most modern army of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Its 
Eastern neighbours could modernize their equipment if we supplied them 
with our (Soviet-German) Main Battle Tank (T 72), which they do not 
have, but would like to have. Should Germany become an arms dealer on 
a large scale?
Years ago the project of the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA = Jager 
90) was justified by the fact that the Soviet Air Force with its MIG 29 
disposed of the most modem aircraft existing world-widely at the time 
being. Now we have 28 of them, a gift of the Unity. It is really as good as 
we supposed, according to our Air Force. But, do we still need the 
European Fighter Aircraft which costs 135 million DM per unit accord­
ing to actual calculations? It would cost only a 20 % if we ordered further 
MIGs 29 and helped the Soviet Union instead, who is neither enemy nor 
opponent any more. Of course, by doing so, we could not expect any 
applause by the armaments industry.
In the Federal Army the authorized number of soldiers amounts to
495.000 and to 170.000 in the National People's Army. Until the end of 
1994, 370.000 of the 660.000 soldiers of German troops will remain,
300.000 thereof in the West and 70.000 in the East. We are therefore 
facing the most important reform of the Bundeswehr since its foundation. 
It would not be fair, to place less than 20 % of our troops in the East, 
which comprises 50 % of our former territory. Why do we need so many 
in the West? Are we threatened from there? In the long run, that is, after 
the retreat of the Soviets in 1994, it is intended that German troops will 
be proportionately stationed as this corresponds to the idea that no attack 
is expected.
Practically, this means territorial defence, troops essentially stationed 
on a permanent base with corresponding equipment, and it means troops, 
who are no longer able to perform big operations of defence or of attack. 
This is an essential detail of German troops since the end of the East-West 
conflict. I shall come back to the subject of the simultaneously necessary 
interventions in another connection.
The second aspect occurs, when by 1994 all German troops will be re­
duced to 370.000 soldiers, the Soviet troops have retreated behind their 
borders, the American troops will be reduced by two thirds, the with­
drawal of the French troops on their territory has been accomplished and 
the reduction of other allied troops on our soil has drawn to a close: then 
one will have to ask, why the Germans still need so many soldiers, namely 
370.000? The course might be set for further disarmament.
The first successful advance concession should be followed by a second 
one. Germany should consider reducing its troops to 250.000 men or 




























































































emy or opponent, when our neighbours, not forgetting the Soviet Union, 
are furthermore reducing their troops.
For many reasons, I support a system of conscription. We need it now, 
more than ever, in order to integrate the East Germans. With 250.000 
soldiers or less, this will no longer be possible, because then it would no 
longer be possible to establish 'justice in service1. The discussion about an 
even partly professional army will become inevitable, if disarmament is 
to be continued after 1994. The Soviet Union has decided to reduce its 
troops to 3 million soldiers - even unilaterally if necessary - to shorten 
the duration of military service and has started to consider whether to 
build up - partially - a Federal professional Army. This would be rather 
obvious especially for high-tech weapons.
It is all the more important to make sure that the Army does not be­
come a state within the state, not even in Russia, but to integrate the 
country in controlled disarmament actions at European level. A similar 
professional German Army would represent neither internally nor exter­
nally a threat, because it would be as little independent as the actual 
Federal Army is right now. It is bound to NATO structures and will re­
main internationally integrated under civil control and command in the 
alliance or another similarly effective European system. National 
sovereignty is as much outdated in the field of security as it is in econ­
omy.
There is no exception to be made for Germany as a nation, after the 
Unity even less than before.
Constitutional Law of the Federal Republic of Germany stipulates that 
its troops can only be engaged in case of defence of the Federal territory 
or within a Collective Security System. The latter is not NATO, but an 
organization of the United Nations. The participation of our troops in the 
Gulf War was thus impossible.
I cannot share the criticism levelled at Germany in this connection. It is 
rather comforting that Germans do not like to shoot any more. We should 
be proud of the refusal, one could hear from Eastern Europe. In Great 
Britain we were even named cowards. The call 'Germans to the front’ 
was heard by a strange coalition of right-wing extremists in Germany and 
westward.
An amendment to the Constitution will be necessary to clarify under 
which conditions other, than an act of aggression against the Federal 
Republic German, soldiers can be engaged.
If the use of force is inevitable, because all other means have failed, as 
it has been stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations, Germany can­
not withdraw behind the principle of letting other people fight and of 
paying for the intervention of others, possibly even their blood. This re­
flection refers already to the possibility, but not the obligation, of partic­




























































































be effective to support actions aiming at the restitution of peace. The 
Amendment to the Constitution should contain this possibility. It corre­
sponds to the obligation we have undertaken by joining the United 
Nations. On the other hand, this obligation should exclude actions to 
which the United Nations entitle other nations, as in the case of the Gulf 
War.
It is probable and even desirable that development will be faster in 
Europe and that we obtain a System of Collective Security earlier in 
Europe than in the United Nations. As I have supported strongly the 
principle of Common Security, I cannot exclude Germany from partici­
pation in equal rights and obligations. Those who refuse to Europe 
Germany's Security partnership, prevent Europe.
A modification of the Constitution will enable Germany to participate 
in all actions under the control and the command of the United Nations, 
additionally within each system of Collective Security in Europe. Besides, 
permanently based territorial troops, a corresponding mobile and well- 
equipped modern Rapid Deployment Force has to be provided, which 
would be suitably equipped for any possible tasks - consisting of between
50.000 and 70.000 men. Germany should refuse the participation of its 
troops in any action like in the Gulf War and refuse, equally, any 
intervention force for actions outside the alliance, independently of the 
consideration of who started them, either NATO or the WEU. History 
and European interest justify this position.
It is strange, indeed, that just after the end of the East-West conflict 
Germany and Japan should modify their constitutions, in order to start 
military actions, or, to be more precise: in order to become better usable. 
The recently acquired sovereignty should not be misused in such a 
manner.
The achievement of internal Unity comes first on the priority list of 
German policy. Afterwards, we can turn to the grown responsibility, that 
the larger Germany undoubtedly has, and which it must not deny.
The starting point is the fact, that Germany has no territorial ambitions 
or claims. Its borders are its borders. The national interest of German 
foreign policy has become a European one. European stability, European 
security, and European collaboration beyond former system's borders in 
order not to become poverty borders, are the interests which have even 
genuinely become specific German ones.
The achievement of Europe comes first on the priority list of 
Germany’s foreign policy; in short: to realize the Charter of Paris.
NATO, like Germany, having neither opponent nor enemy, is eagerly 
looking for new opponents and risks. Although it does not have a new 
strategy so far, it had already prepared plans for the troops becoming 
necessary. What Defence Ministers have conceived is truly grotesque. 




























































































the peace dividend urgently needed for increasing stability in Eastern 
Europe. Undenied risks in Eastern Europe are used as arguments for 
decisions which would nourish or even create these risks. Thus, if new 
weapon systems are demanded, air- or sea-based nuclear weapons, one 
can be sure that potential target countries will feel threatened and provide 
themselves with same. At the moment, where each Dollar and each Mark 
is needed to eliminate non-military risks, the Ministers of Defence suggest 
that NATO starts a new armament race which practically means advance- 
armament. Hopefully, this will be prevented by the Government leaders, 
confirming the decision which has been taken by the US President without 
asking his allies.
The western defence alliance must not create threatening instruments 
against Eastern Europe - and especially the Soviet Union - nor towards 
developing countries south of the Mediterranean Sea. If the Soviet Union 
is not mentioned for psychological or political reasons, the intention will 
be there all the same, since Moscow will remain more powerful than 
Tripoli. After the abolishment of all medium range land-based missiles by 
the INF-convention (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces), Germany 
should insist that no new run is started in the remaining unregulated sec­
tor of air- and sea-based weapons. In our own, and in the interest of the 
Soviet Union, we should oblige them not to develop new weapons instead 
of giving them pretexts for doing so.
If we recognize this interest, the grown responsibility an expanded 
Germany demands a corresponding position which means: courage will be 
required to refuse qualitatively new armament.
A further consequence of the solemn Charter of Paris is the rein­
forcement of all-European cooperation and all-European structures. This 
means that NATO decides on new strategies without contacting the 
Eastern European countries including Moscow, before knowing about 
common worries and fears and so to enable planning in mutual knowl­
edge. Otherwise, strategies against each other would be developed again.
Germany should not agree to any new strategy developed without 
knowledge of its Eastern partners. Neither should Germany agree to any 
new weapon-program, before the new strategy is adopted and before it is 
clear for what purpose which kind of troops are needed. Finally, 
Germany should refuse decisions which interfere with the promised 
growing-together of all-Europe. The Charter of Paris must not be vio­
lated by Germany.
The Ministers of Defence have suggested the old way: Western Europe 
under American leadership; in Copenhagen, the Foreign Ministers have 
put against it their model of an all-European collaboration. The 
Government Heads of State shall have to take a decision between the two 




























































































bility has become entirely evident; against Germany no decision will be 
possible.
The question of the increased German responsibility on a more global 
scale remains unsolved. Here, we have to start with the very knowledge 
that security is to be defined less militarily, but more economically and 
ecologically. We, and especially the United Nations, have to develop 
global rules and reinforce global institutions. This leads to the suggestion, 
that a German Peace Corps should be established in which the service will 
be equated with the military service, which has to be equipped with the 
latest technology in order to fight against environmental damages of all 
kinds and which could be mobilized in case of environmental catastrophes 
and to offer humanitarian help. This could be done under national or 
international control. Such peace troops would be working in the Gulf 
and Iran right now, if we had them. In Germany, the peace troops would 
have a lot of work to eliminate the damages caused by foreign troops. 
They could be put under the command of the Home Ministry and could 
become an interesting model for conversion by collaborating with the 
economy, financed according to identical principles as those applied to the 
collaboration between Federal Army and economy.
The prevention of international conflicts and the development of crisis 
management, including the German engagement by people, knowledge 
and money, this is a field where the Federal Republic of Germany could 
develop ambition.
The word 'Ostpolitik' has been adopted by many languages. Ostpolitik 
was an attempt to overcome the East-West conflict by developing our own 
actions. Thus, it lasted from the building of the Berlin Wall until its fall. 
Now, European policy is substituting the Ostpolitik.
After both German states had lost their former leading powers, without 
intention of comparing them, in fact, German policy has now attained 
maturity, at least theoretically. After its westward orientation, has taken 
priority in German policy so far, its identity should now become all- 
European. It should jealously guard, that the surmounting of the 
European separation does not fail due to Germany. The establishment of 
national stability and inner Unity remain priority targets. As regards 
foreign policy, the German interest must be defined as a European one: 
the interest in establishing a stable independent Europe, where there can 
be no more war between its member states.
4. Armament and Disarmament in the New World
While the East-West conflict has been settled peacefully, the armament 
dynamics have continued without interruption. It is no exaggeration to say 




























































































decade of disarmament, if nothing is done to stop such development. It is 
'chic' to be modern. In connection with armament, a very modern el­
ement remains hidden behind the word 'modernization': the improvement 
of existing equipment. Nothing is said about improving steel helmets or 
increasing the precision of machine guns or even their range. None of 
these modernizations do change strategic options.
But, if it is a matter of technical innovation leading to drastic modifi­
cations of strategy, and further still, to new political and military options, 
this matter becomes dangerous. That is our situation right now.
Of course, it is impossible to forbid basic research or to control scien­
tific progress, but the results of human inventive genius can equally be 
used for civilian as well as military purposes. Initially there is often a 
scientific idea, that will only later be recognized as being relevant for 
military purposes. According to SIPRI-data from 1987, approximately
750.000 of the 4 million scientists and engineers working in the field of 
science and development all over the world were directly concerned with 
military research and development, and they were by no means the worst 
of them. It is not only more interesting to develop electronic guns than to 
work on the improvement of refrigerators, but one gets a lot of more 
money for it, too. This year, in February, the American Minister of 
Defence, Richard Cheney declared when he presented the budget for 1992 
and 1993: 'This will be a decade of development more than of pro­
duction.'
Many sectors in physics, computer science, electronics, space technol­
ogy, chemistry and biology are armament-relevant. Cheney has under­
lined 'that technology breakthroughs will change military art, as our 
Stealth fighters today played a disproportionate role in the air-war in 
Iraq1. In the Gulf-War, space was fully integrated in the actions from the 
start. It gave qualitative armament an impulsion in the direction of small, 
modern, high-tech, superior, unlimitedly expensive and may be even un­
payable, if one is approaching it from a cost-benefit analysis.
Whether wars will become feasible again, when nowadays the quota of 
losses between the two sides amounts to the fantastic relation of 187 to 
more than 100.000, is a serious question, which does not touch the prob­
lem of ecological and political costs, whatsoever.
Weapon systems, which are studied in laboratories today, were science- 
fiction yesterday, become possible tomorrow. For instance, if one can 
successfully electronically start shells without a tube, in principle, all 
tanks can be thrown away. This result would not be that bad, but on the 
other hand, the newer strategic options eventually resulting from quali­
tative breakthroughs, create new security problems. One would not like to 
test them.
Against whom by the way? Against the Third World? After the end of 




























































































came to an end. In future, disarmament will have to include the quality of 
new technical developments. It would have been ridiculous to be proud of 
the abolishment of cavalry, whilst replacing it with the invention of the 
machine gun. It is also stupid to be able to control actual armament 
systems, whilst on the other hand, a new armament race is started with 
qualitatively new weapons.
Furthermore, one has to ask: a race against whom? Japan has proved 
that military spin-off is unnecessary to increase its economic weight. 
Russia needs its energies and capacities for economic recovery. America 
should be released from running a race against itself, because after the 
end of the East-West conflict nobody would join it in the race. In other 
words: in order not to let modernization continue out of habit, it has to be 
checked by contracts.
ABM was the first treaty forbidding weapons, which did not even exist 
and this was during an era of confrontation. It has since been leaked that 
the United States pushed forth its SDI program. But at times, when 
democratic partners and friends have established themselves in the 
Empire of Evil, it must become possible to make an agreement against 
senseless modernization, an agreement which can be controlled effi­
ciently. The budgets for research programs should be reduced; lack of 
money is still an efficient disarmer, and money is what we urgently need 
for other arguably more important things. In this respect I can foresee 
agreements about a public disclosure of plans between laboratory and 
testing phases or between testing and introduction to the troops.
One thing has to be clear however: all plans for the present modern­
ization and armament are children of confrontation. We must not let hu­
man inventive genius prolong or revive the problems deriving from the 
past world of confrontation.
What shall Europe do after the end of the East-West conflict and the 
collapse of Communism?
For quite some time I, too, have imagined that we should begin with 
security-political measures aiming at détente and arms reduction, more­
over in order to overcome the political consequences of the European and 
German split. In 1968 after the intervention of the Warsaw Pact in 
Czechoslovakia, I have formulated this task as follows: we must try to se­
cure that the Spring of Prague takes place in Moscow, because in that case 
at least the Czechs would not march into the Soviet Union. Historically, 
this means trying to heal Eastern Europe from a disease called 
Communism. The way planned, therefore, was détente, small steps and 
negotiations with those who were in power, SED as well as CPSU, inspite 
of anything we knew. The way led through Helsinki, the renunciation of 
force concerning all borders in Europe, international law, economic 
collaboration and led to Common Security and the principle agreed on 




























































































survival - is more important than any ideological dispute. On this basis 
one could and should disarm until mutual disability to launch an attack is 
reached. Later still, the opponents would become partners.
Before this happened, however, a democratic revolution took place. 
Security was overtaken by policy.
Now security makes it claim, which means the task of guaranteeing 
control and, by agreement, the inability to launch an attack. What used to 
be a peace-maker for the European house, has now to become guarantor 
for the European house.
Let us now briefly consider the question of nuclear weapons: these are 
not improved weapons, but of a new quality. Whoever unleashes them, 
risks the fate of his own nation.
Nobody should be entitled to have a say in the fate of a nation, not even 
your best ally. So, it is understandable that nuclear power is not shared 
with anybody else, in deciding whether or not to use nuclear weapons, not 
even America with Great Britain, let alone France with Germany. No 
German Chancellor will ever obtain not even the negative right of co­
determination against the use of nuclear weapons, let alone veto right; as 
such a right would mean, that a German Chancellor would be able to 
extricate nuclear weapons from an American or French President.
There is a principal non-modifiable inequality between nuclear states, 
who represent a threat for the fate of other people and the non-nuclear 
states, who are unable to do so, on the contrary. This inequality cannot be 
removed.
It can only be relativized by the disposal of ones own territory. Non­
nuclear states can decide whether or not to permit the stationing of nu­
clear weapons on their territory. Non-nuclear states take their own deci­
sion, if they increase, modernize, reduce or scrap their arms. No non­
nuclear state has even participated in the negotiations about this matter. 
Thus let the nuclear states be contented with their arms, if they believe 
them to be necessary for their happiness.
Ten years ago, I summarized the consequences thereof, in an Annex to 
the Palme-Report, in the following formula: no nuclear weapons on the 
territory of states, which do not already possess them.
In the case of war, the temptation to let off a firecracker with tactical 
nuclear weapons, which are unable to reach the destination of any other 
super-power and thereafter stop it, being terrified by the result, would be 
too great. Thereafter could have meant after the existence of my people. 
The technical differentiation between strategic and non-strategic weapons 
was the background for the American discussion about a limited war 
limited in Europe, and it was as a small additional matter, that a good 
French friend of mine said, that Pershing II would postpone the German 





























































































If it was in the national interest to eliminate nuclear weapons from 
German soil before the end of the East-West conflict, this belief can cer­
tainly no longer be rejected now, with the reproach that we would play 
into the Soviet's hands by doing so.
I think that Germany should not only insist on removing all nuclear 
weapons and warheads, but also strictly refuse any further deployment of 
new nuclear arms on its territory. I believe that this is the interest of all 
non-nuclear states, too, but it has to be determined by each state on its 
own. Germany should adopt this position and leave it up to any other state 
to decide whether or not it wants to accept new air-based bombs on its 
territory.
The owners of nuclear weapons are able to produce new ones, if they 
have the necessary money. But, please, only on their own territory. It 
should become a principle of European security policy following the end 
of the East-West conflict, that nuclear weapons be exclusively deployed 
on the territory of their owners. This would mean more security, by the 
way; for American troops in Germany and elsewhere, too; they would 
benefit from the same security enjoyed by many millions of Europeans: 
that means: NO NUKES - NO TROOPS can no longer remain the 
American position.
Another very incomprehensible interest of the United States shall have 
to be modified: their refusal to include the Naval forces in disarmament 
talks. They began with START, but the whole complex area of cruise 
missiles has not been regulated. Some people in NATO speak of new risks 
resulting from the delicate situation in the Soviet Union, but they do not 
speak about the, as yet unlimited possibilities for the Soviet Union to 
increase their numbers of submarines equipped with nuclear weapons. 
The political instability and subsequent risks cannot be fought with 
weapons. An intervention by NATO is out of the question. The potential 
risk of existing sea-based nuclear weapons can only be excluded by con­
trollable negotiation results.
This also applies to an enclosed sea, as for example, the Baltic Sea. It 
could apply to the Black Sea, too, but I do not dare to judge the compli­
cated situation in the Mediterranean and would like to leave the oceans up 
to those who rule them and are experts in the matter. However, a limita­
tion of nuclear naval armament is a real European interest. Europe should 
insist upon it.
If one tries to think about future security for and in Europe after the 
end of the East-West-conflict, since the German unification, and after the 
break-down of the former Soviet Union, it is obvious first and foremost, 
that military questions no longer play the role they formerly played 
during the past decades. Security used to mean protection against potential 




























































































potential threat of poverty and denied human rights. The future price 
could be higher than the hitherto existing expenses.
Nevertheless, in the future, security in, and for Europe, has still or has 
again to be considered in military terms. One of the reasons is tradition, a 
more important one is the question of money, i.e. resources: as nobody 
can spend one Rubel or one Dollar, one Lira or Franc twice - all coun­
tries being short of money - one has to protect oneself from misinvest- 
ment. We cannot spend money on useless military equipment that will 
later mean that funds for necessary economic expenditure is lacking. The 
third reason is that wrong security approaches will certainly have unde­
sired consequences.
Future structures of European security have to be considered from 
these points of view, proceeding from a definition of interests, and by 
analyzing what is desirable and what is not, what is probable and what is 
not, and what reality looks like today?
No doubt, the Western European interest is to reach a state where wars 
between countries are physically impossible. I think that in Eastern 
Europe this interest is shared. Obviously such a state cannot be reached 
without either sides, but only together.
Already here, very fundamental questions come to mind. 1 ask them as 
one of the 'fathers' of the idea of Common Security. Common Security 
was the result of the conclusion that war can no longer be won by either 
side. Nuclear weapons, and the sensitivity of our highly developed civi­
lizations, have abolished any hope of winning a war in the classical sense 
of victory. As both sides face the alternatives of living together or dying 
together, they logically became partners of Common Security inspite of 
existing ideological or social controversies. Common Security was a 
doctrine made for the nuclear era with ongoing confrontation between 
East and West. This confrontation has now come to an end.
Therefore, the doctrine of Common Security, itself, has become obso­
lete. Politically NATO has put the former political opponent in the place 
of a potential friend. President Bush uses similar vocabulary. After all, 
the Charter of Paris was signed as an obligation and formulated pan- 
European collaboration, by which pan-European structures have first 
been decided upon, even if they are still weak.
To take this argument to its logical conclusion, the result will be that 
security in and for Europe is conceivable neither without, nor against, but 
only together with the former Soviet Union. We can now bring to a close 
the academic discussion, that beyond the area between the Atlantic and the 
Urals, there is another and even bigger area between the Urals and 
Vladivostok. During the negotiations on the Intermediate-Range-Nuclear- 
Forces-Treaty, which had already caused us a lot of trouble, but which 
was solved logically, by concluding the treaty with worldwide 




























































































whole of Soviet territory. It is encouraging that Bush and Gorbachov did 
underline the security perspective for the area between Vancouver and 
Vladivostok.
Of course, pan-European security cannot be organized if the Soviet 
Union or Russia, east of the Urals, is allowed to build up forces of indef­
inite size and power without control. To contemplate European security 
including the Soviet Union, means to take into account the total area of 
the Soviet Union.
It is an open question, whether the Soviet Union wants that. 
Furtherstill, one cannot predict whether, the new union is prepared to 
face such considerations, but for sure, this will be so only if its own se­
curity interests are respected, as much as those of the West- or Central- 
European partners; anyhow, this would be a plausible consideration.
In this respect, let us come back to the relationship between America 
and Russia. A pan-European security system would not only constitute an 
element of security for Russia and the new Republics against America, but 
equally a buffer of security for America against them. Pan-European 
structures mean mutual control, the integration of staff and the partici­
pation of American and Soviet officers. As a matter of fact, which kind of 
interest, and which country will be harmed by this procedure? Of course 
America would have no longer a dominating position in Europe. It would 
be a partner with equal rights and obligations like any other European 
country.
The prevailing bilateral strategic relation of global weapons between 
Washington and Moscow would remain unaltered by this fact.
It would be regrettable, however, if America refused this position, be­
cause in doing so the economic differences between America and Europe 
might intensify. But for the purpose of conventional defence, Europe does 
not depend any longer on the American presence. It is able to protect 
itself against an attack by the Ukraine or Kasakstan, and even by Russia 
and in an European security system even more. The global umbrella of 
strategic weapons opened by Moscow and Washington, remains effective 
at least for the foreseeable future.
Thus, if one envisages a pan-European system of security, a shift has to 
be taken from the doctrine of Common Security to the one of Collective 
Security.
Collective Security means equal rights and obligations of all its partners 
aiming at mutual security. In other words; if one of the partners breaks 
the rules, all the other parties are aligned, or to be more precise, they are 
allies against the violator.
The second rule of Collective Security is the common defence against 
foreign aggression against all or only one of the parties.
Practically speaking, this means making our new friend, the Soviet 




























































































any kind of aggression. I do not think that the latter would be very risky, 
as an attack by China or Japan or Afghanistan or Iran, is very improba­
ble.
Military structures should be determined for both internal and external 
security. They should lead to a mutual incapacity of attack whilst at the 
same time providing the necessary capacity for defence against an outside 
aggressor. In principle this leads to territorial forces, deployed for terri­
torial defence according to the above principles. The Soviet Union and its 
border of more than 7000 km with China, demands, of course, more 
troops than for instance Germany, with its only some hundreds kilometres 
of border with Poland or France. This comparison is intended to show 
that a military threat to Germany coming from Poland or the Soviet 
Union need not be taken more seriously than a threat by France or Italy.
Besides having territorial forces, the integrated intervention of troops, 
i.e. modern and highly mobile troops under international command, 
would be necessary in order to put emphasis on the sanctions, to be met 
by any state violating the agreed obligations. These intervention forces, to 
which each participant state would have to contribute to an appropriate 
extent, should be sufficient to constitute a convincing military deterrent 
against hostility towards the political commitment.
Collective Security between Lisbon and Vladivostok, between partners 
with equal rights, would consist of conventionally equipped forces only. 
The nuclear weapons would remain exclusively at the disposal of their 
owners. But one cannot deny that such a system, deserving the name of 
European Peace Order, would raise the question of to what purpose the 
four nuclear powers still need nuclear weapons.
Of course, a European Peace Order with conventional troops envisages 
the United States as a physically present partner in a system, where the 
former conflict-orientated way of thinking and the conflict-potential of 
the former Soviet Union becomes obsolete. At the same time, by includ­
ing the United States, such a system would be an instrument of security 
for the former Soviet Union.
Nuclear weapons would no longer be justified by mutual threat, but 
only by nuclear threats from a fifth nuclear power, China, or any other 
new nuclear power. Arsenals against such risks could have 1 to 2 percent 
of the current arsenals. This is more so since one can proceed on the as­
sumption that China has developed its nuclear weapons for deterrence 
rather than to create a threat. It would not exclude itself from an asso­
ciation of nuclear powers with rules to prevent nuclear blackmail from 
the powers which are as yet non-nuclear. Here, a realistic perspective is 
on the horizon, not of complete elimination of nuclear weapons, but of a 
global regime reducing the current arsenals to a strict minimum. The 
Bush proposal, which can lead to a system of common command and 




























































































I come to the conclusion that a European Peace Order based on con­
ventional collective defence would practically free the world from the 
nuclear war threat and would thereby develop real global effects.
Two facts remain to be considered: First: what kind of political order 
will the former Soviet Union arrive at? Second: would such a collective 
order enable or demand interventions, for instance in the case of 
Yugoslavia?
To the first question: The Soviet power of veto in the Security Council 
of the United Nations can neither be divided nor multiplied by 10. The 
same applies to the continuation of the strategic START-negotiations 
which now have to include the navies. Space-deployed observation sys­
tems and air defence systems are launched from Baikonur which is situ­
ated in Kasakstan. Many arguments speak in favour of competence for 
security remaining in the hands of the Union accepting the consequences 
resulting from such a decision.
All Republics joining the Union would benefit from the pan-European 
guaranteed controlled conventional security against each other or against 
an external threat. There is no better security system for the Baltic 
Republics, Poland, the Union, or even Russia than the European one, the 
members of which are either individual states or the Union.
The European Peace Order of conventional collective security is suf­
ficiently elastic to have practical effects, which means stability for the 
nations and republics with a view on Europe, and at the same time com­
plete freedom of confederate or other constitutional structures of the 
Union.
But if southern Republics leave the Union and establish close political 
links, with their neighbours in the south, then in the field of security, they 
would of course no longer be part of the European Peace Order and 
could neither be obliged to abide by its rules nor expect its protection. 
Nobody can exclude the possibility that southern Republics, which are 
finding their way to independence, might try to help members of their 
nationality, who live in another state, for the purpose of 
self-determination or unification. These problems can occur with or 
without a European Peace Order. They could be diffused more easily 
with a European Peace Order, because, as I said before, such Republics or 
States could neither expect protection nor help from a European Peace 
Order.
To the second question: Partly when dealing with the new situation of 
the United Nations, and partly when dealing with the consequences for 
Europe of the termination of the East-West conflict, I had already men­
tioned the problem of minorities, of respect of human rights and, finally, 
of involvement in what we have so far considered as exclusively internal 
problems of states in the sense of the United Nations Charter. I do not 




























































































European Peace Order, this means that such an Order might be able to 
formulate and guarantee the new rights of peoples in and between the 
states and - in case of violation - to enforce them at an earlier date than 
the United Nations.
Now I come back to the question asked at the beginning of this discus­
sion about the probable developments given the real situation.
Reality today is characterized by the factors of reliability and stability 
which are represented by NATO and the European Community, which is 
more than ever a West European creation, and, conversely a reality made 
by the former Soviet Union looking for new stability. Such a situation 
understandably needs precautions, in order not to risk an established or­
der and not to obstruct new opportunities, but to make use of them: 
without putting anything at stake and in order not to gamble away ones 
chances.
The strongest argument in favour of a European Peace Order I dealt 
with in connection with my considerations on Russia, concerns the break­
down of the central state and the autocratic party system; provided that an 
outbreak of new national conflicts can at all be avoided, it could alter­
natively be achieved with a pan-European framework as a reference; a 
goal, a buffer - in simple terms; if we were to embrace Russia and its 
peoples instead of leaving them to their own devices.
Another way would be the consolidation of ones own security politics, 
in order to wait and see how the Republics of the Soviet Union consoli­
date themselves, which would mean a continuation of the doctrine of 
Common Security towards the Soviet Union instead of collectivity: the 
alternative lies somewhere between partnership and alliance.
This alternative will possibly soon be decided upon. If a new NATO 
strategy is to be determined, the Union of the Soviet Republics will also 
have to decide upon its own strategy; then we will have to deal with a 
Western European, and a Soviet, security system; hence there would be a 
danger that the two strategies would be set off against each other; in this 
case entirely different weapons and structuring of forces would of course 
be required. Unified security is entirely different from security against 
each other. Thus, the pan-European perspective, to which the nations and 
Republics of the former Soviet Union ought to be Parties, would not be 
created. In such a case it would be necessary to decide on what security 
means to, if at all, adopt for Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the 
three Baltic States; will they get guarantees? If so, by whom? Will there 
be two systems of air control and defence in Europe? And what will the 
situation be like for the states situated in the vacuum between these two 
systems?
Finally, what are the risks for today's NATO, for which a new strategy 
will be developed? They can only come from outside. Outside will be 




























































































border between Turkey and Iraq and Syria. So far, NATO is exclusively 
based on the doctrine of territorial integrity, that is, the defence of its 
members. If a doctrine of intervention - that is, the right of intervention, 
in order to defend ones interests outside the defined area - is to be for­
mulated, for the first time, would it include interventions in the area of 
the former Soviet Union? It would be grotesque if NATO came to such 
conclusions after the end of the East-West conflict, which would make 
their declared friends opponents, at least to a small extent.
It is not surprising that Governments are inclined to conservative 
thinking, and do not discuss Collective Security for Europe, but it is re­
ally encouraging, that Washington and Bonn speak about cooperative 
regulations in the field of future security. Cooperation is like an ouver- 
ture to the opera of collectivity.
We live in times where tanks and troops in the Soviet Union have 
proved to be incapable of suppressing an elementary democratic move­
ment. I cannot imagine any case where a military intervention of NATO 
would be justified or would be able to solve any kind of conflict in the 
former Soviet Union whatsoever. And I cannot see any weapons system 
that should be modernized or developed as a new phenomenon on the 
grounds of new risks in the East.
In the Charter of Paris, the European countries obliged eachother to 
develop pan-European structures. It would be a breach of the Charter, if 
the West adopted a new strategy without at least an obligation not to in­
troduce it without consultation and possibly the agreement of the other 
Signatories to the Charter of Paris. Either NATO is going to open up for 
further states including the Soviet Union, and thus become the military 
structure of a European Peace Order, or we develop such structure based 
on the CSCE-principles.
It would be easy to continue Common Security between East and West, 
perhaps with a slight shift to the East; this perspective, however, speaks in 
favour of developing an European Peace Order of Collective 
Conventional Security. The first alternative was based on the logical 
progress after the end of the East-West-conflict, the second one has be­
come possible after the break-down of the former Soviet Union.
The first alternative justifies, for instance, the development of a new 
modern fighter able to compete with the most modern Soviet aircraft; the 
second alternative has to take into account the ability of corresponding 
aircraft in China or India, in Iran or Libya. The issue is clearly that, we 
do not need to capitalise on the continuation of Soviet risks in the interest 
of our arms industry. If it goes as far as to misinvestments, we are going 
to lack the means necessary to diminish non-military risks for the West, 
that is the revolution of poverty.
Finally, there is another argument: it might take decades before the 




























































































curity in and for Europe cannot wait such a long time. It has to be 
reached earlier, in a way which will enable it to support political and 
economic stability in the Soviet Union. This could be done by the 
European Peace Order.
A European Peace Order would be the best foundation for equipping 
our social order with the necessary means for defending ourselves against 
non-military attacks.
The idea of a European Peace Order creates the European Unity by 
collaboration. It is based on equality of its states, equality of rights for 
individuals and minorities and identical security for its peoples. All his­
torical examples show that where this has been attempted by force, they 
drowned in blood and caused heaps of corpses. Now, for the first time, 
the European Unity is in sight since the end of the East-West conflict, and 
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